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Abstract
This paper explores a theory of generalization for learning problems on product distributions,
complementing the existing learning theories in the sense that it does not rely on any complexity
measures of the hypothesis classes. The main contributions are two general sample complexity
bounds: (1) O˜
`
nk
ǫ2
˘
samples are sufficient and necessary for learning an ǫ-optimal hypothesis in
any problem on an n-dimensional product distribution, whose marginals have finite supports of
sizes at most k; (2) O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
samples are sufficient and necessary for any problem on n-dimensional
product distributions if it satisfies a notion of strong monotonicity from the algorithmic game
theory literature. As applications of these theories, we match the optimal sample complexity
for single-parameter revenue maximization (Guo et al., STOC 2019), improve the state-of-the-
art for multi-parameter revenue maximization (Gonczarowski and Weinberg, FOCS 2018) and
prophet inequality (Correa et al., EC 2019; Rubinstein et al., ITCS 2020), and provide the first
and tight sample complexity bound for Pandora’s problem.
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1 Introduction
The learning process is a process of choosing an appropriate function from a given set
of functions. — Vapnik [37]
Generalization is widely recognized as one of the fundamental pillars of learning theory. A general
learning problem asks whether we can select a function, often referred to as a hypothesis, from a
hypothesis class to maximize or minimize the expectation w.r.t. an underlying distribution over the
data domain, based on samples from the distribution. While it may be easy to select a hypothesis
the maximizes or minimizes the average over the samples, how can we ensure that it generalizes and
gets a similar performance on the underlying distribution? More quantitatively, we may ask about
its sample complexity: how many samples are sufficient and necessary for choosing a hypothesis
that is optimal on the true distribution up to an ǫ error?
A widely studied example is the classification problem in supervised learning. In this problem,
each data point is a feature-label pair px, yq P X ˆY , where X is the feature domain, e.g., Rn, and
Y is the label domain, e.g., t0, 1u. Each hypothesis corresponds to a classifier, i.e., a feature-to-
label mapping f : X ÞÑ Y ; its value on a data point px, yq is L`fpxq, y˘ for some loss function L,
e.g.,
ˇˇ
fpxq ´ yˇˇ. The goal is to learn a classifier from samples to minimize the expected loss on the
underlying distribution.
Meanwhile, the general learning problem also captures a wide range of optimization problems
in the Bayesian model. The problem of learning revenue-maximizing auctions from data is a recent
example, which has received a lot of attention in algorithmic game theory and more generally in
theoretical computer science. In this example, each data point comprises the valuations of the
bidders; each hypothesis corresponds to an auction and its value is defined to be the revenue of the
auction on the given valuations. We aim to learn an auction from sample valuations to maximize
the expected revenue on the underlying value distributions.
1.1 Generalization from Complexity Measures of the Hypothesis Class
Most sample complexity bounds in learning theory rely on detailed structures of the hypothesis
class H, and they hold for arbitrary distributions over the data domain. In particular, they build
on various complexity measures of the hypothesis class, including the covering number [1], Vapnik-
Chervonenkis (VC) dimension [36], Natarajan dimesnion [27], pseudo-dimension [29], fat-shattering
dimension [5], Rademacher complexity [4, 22], local Rademacher complexity [6], etc. Informally,
each complexity measure provides a parameter d which represents the “degrees-of-freedom” of the
hypothesis class H, and the corresponding sample complexity upper bound has the form O˜
`
d
ǫ2
˘
.
For example, the VC dimension characterizes the sample complexity of binary classification
problems, and the Natarajan dimesnion captures that of multiclass classification problems (see,
e.g., Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [33]), if the underlying distribution could be arbitrary.
Further, the example of learning revenue-optimal auctions from data, in particular, the special
case of selling a single item to n bidders, has been investigated using the covering number (e.g.,
Devanur et al. [14], Gonczarowski and Nisan [17]), pseudo-dimension (e.g., Morgenstern and Rough-
garden [25]), and Rademacher complexity (e.g., Syrgkanis [34]). The “degrees-of-freedom” bounds
in these works are all O˜
`
n
ǫ
˘
and thus, lead to the same O˜
`
n
ǫ3
˘
sample complexity upper bound.1 The
bound once again holds for arbitrary distributions of the valuations, even correlated ones, although
the problem of revenue-optimal auction design often considers product value distributions.
1Nonetheless, these works are different in that they either prove sample complexity bounds for different families
of distributions beyond the r0, 1s-bounded ones, and/or provide slightly different bounds in the logarithmic factors.
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1.2 Our Contributions: a Theory of Generalization on Product Distributions
While the above theories suggest that simpler hypotheses generalize better, it has been increasingly
important to consider complex ones. On the one hand, deep neural networks generalize surprisingly
well on classification problems on real-world data despite their complexity (e.g., Zhang et al. [39]).
On the other hand, the revenue-optimal auction for selling even two heterogeneous items could
have an infinite menu complexity (e.g., Daskalakis et al. [13]). To this end, this paper asks:
Is there a complementary theory of generalization building on the simplicity of data
instead of the hypothesis class?
In particular, it is standard to assume that the data is drawn from a product distribution in
optimization problems in the Bayesian model, including the aforementioned revenue-maximization
problem, and prophet inequality and Pandora’s problem. Can we get sample complexity bounds
from the independence of data dimensions, and only minimum knowledge about the hypotheses?
Implicit Attempts in Previous Works. We first review several recent sample complexity
bounds for specific optimization problems that implicitly explore the power of independent data
dimensions. Cole and Roughgarden [10] and Roughgarden and Schrijvers [30] used independence in
the single-parameter revenue maximization problems to analyze coordinate-wise the convergence of
the empirical distribution to the true distribution. Correa et al. [12] employed a similar approach
on prophet inequality. Their analyses of convergence, however, are problem dependent.
Cai and Daskalakis [8] proposed a hybrid argument that used the independence of data dimen-
sions in multi-item auctions to derive sample complexity bounds from complexity measures of the
hypothesis class w.r.t. each coordinate of the data domain. Their hybrid approach benefits from
independence, yet still relies on complexity measures of the hypothesis class.
Gonczarowski and Weinberg [18] and Guo et al. [19] are the closest to this paper. Gonczarowski
and Weinberg [18] exploited independence in multi-parameter revenue maximization to construct
an improved covering number that holds specifically on product distributions. Although they did
not explicitly ask the above conceptual question, their techniques implicitly showed generalization
of complex hypotheses on product distributions; the resulting bound is inferior in the logarithmic
factor compared to Theorem 1 in this paper. Guo et al. [19] used independent data dimensions and
a notion of monotonicity to derive optimal sample complexity bounds for single-parameter revenue
maximization problems in the matroid setting. It is the closest to this paper. Part of our results
can be viewed as generalizing theirs to all problems with the same notion of monotonicity.
Our Results. The contributions of the paper are two general sample complexity bounds from
the independence of data dimensions, unrelated to any complexity measures of the hypothesis class.
Both results use the same algorithm which we call the product empirical reward maximizer/risk
minimize (PERM). It selects the best hypothesis w.r.t. a product empirical distribution such that
each coordinate is a uniform distribution over the corresponding coordinate of the samples. This is
different from the usual notion of empirical distribution, i.e., the uniform distribution over sample
vectors, which is not a product distribution in general. The first result considers finite data domains.
Informal Theorem. Suppose the data has n independent dimensions, each of which takes up to
k possible values. Then, O
`
nk
ǫ2
log 1
δ
˘
samples are sufficient for learning any hypothesis class up to
ǫ-optimal with probability at least 1´ δ. Further, Ω`nk
ǫ2
˘
samples are necessary.
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This paper
Previous results
Finite domain (§3) Strong monotonicity (§4)
General bound O
`
nk
ǫ2
log 1
δ
˘
O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
-
Single-parameter O
`
n
ǫ3
log 1
δ
˘
O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
[19]
Multi-parameter O
`
n
ǫ4
log 1
δ
˘
- O
`
n
ǫ4
log n
ǫδ
˘
[18]
Prophet inequality O
`
n
ǫ3
log 1
δ
˘
O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
O˜
`
n2
ǫ2
˘
[12], O˜
`
n
ǫ6
˘
[31]
Pandora’s problem O
`
n3
ǫ3
log 1
δ
˘
O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
-
Table 1: Summary of sample complexity upper bounds, in comparisons with the state-of-the-art.
The results in bold are the best upper bounds in different settings. We use single-item auctions, and
n-item auctions with a unit-demand bidder as the running examples of single- and multi-parameter
revenue maximization. The bounds may vary in other settings; see Sec. 3 and 4.
The proof of the upper bound is simple in hindsight. We bound the total variation distance
between the product empirical distribution and the true distribution, using the connection between
the total variation distance and the Hellinger distance, and a vector concentration inequality.
Despite its simplicity, the above result gives strong sample complexity upper bounds for the
aforementioned optimization problems. In single-parameter revenue maximization, e.g., single-item
auctions, the value can be discretized to multiples of ǫ [14]; replacing k “ 1
ǫ
gives an O
`
n
ǫ3
log 1
δ
˘
upper bound. In other words, without any knowledge of auction theory, other than the fact that
the value domain could be discretized, the theorem improves the sample complexity upper bounds
derived from various complexity measures based on detailed understandings of single-parameter
auctions as discussed in Section 1.1, in the log factor.
In multi-parameter revenue maximization, e.g., with one unit-demand bidder and n items, the
value domain can be discretized to multiples of ǫ2 [2]; hence, letting k “ 1
ǫ2
gives an O
`
n
ǫ4
log 1
δ
˘
upper bound, improving the state-of-the-art by Gonczarowski and Weinberg [18] in the log factor.2
Further, we show that the type domain in prophet inequality can be discretized to multiples of
ǫ, leading to an O
`
n
ǫ3
log 1
δ
˘
upper bound. It improves the best previous bound by Correa et al. [12]
in the dependence in n, and the concurrent effort by Rubinstein et al. [31] in the dependence in ǫ.
In prophet inequality with i.i.d. rewards in particular, it implies that O˜
`
n
˘
samples are sufficient
to learn a 0.745-competitive algorithm, answering an open question by Correa et al. [12].3
Finally, we show that the type domain of Pandora’s problem can also be discretized to multiples
of ǫ, giving the first polynomial sample complexity bound for the problem.
Our second result revisits the notion of strong monotonicity, a key ingredient of the optimal
sample complexity bounds for single-parameter revenue maximization by Guo et al. [19]. Strong
monotonicity means that the expected value of the optimal hypothesis w.r.t. a distribution D˜ does
not decrease when it is applied to another distribution D that stochastically dominates D˜. We
generalize the analysis by Guo et al. [19] to any strongly monotone problem.
Informal Theorem. Suppose the data has n independent dimensions. Then, Θ˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
samples are
sufficient and necessary for learning an arbitrary strongly monotone hypothesis class.
2Gonczarowski and Weinberg [18] only claim polynomial sample complexity; the stated bound is derived using
their techniques to the best of our efforts.
3The best algorithm, with full knowledge of the distribution, is strictly better than 0.745-competitive. Hence, we
may consider ǫ a constant in this result. Further, unlike our model, Correa et al. [12] consider unbounded distributions
and multiplicative approximation; nonetheless, Appendix B.4 shows how to get the stated bounds in their model.
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Further, we show that prophet inequality and Pandora’s problem are both strongly monotone.
Using this theorem, we get an O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
upper bound for single-parameter revenue maximization,
prophet inequality, and Pandora’s problem.4 The linear dependence on the data dimension n is tight
for all three problems. We remark that while the bound for single-parameter revenue maximization
is the same as that by Guo et al. [19], ours directly uses the PERM, which corresponds to the
empirical Myerson auction, while that by Guo et al. [19] needs an appropriate regularization to the
product empirical distributions and uses the corresponding regularized empirical Myerson auction.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
A general learning problem (e.g., Chapter 1.4 of Vapnik [35]) is defined by a hypothesis class denoted
as H. We will abuse notation and refer to the problem defined by a hypothesis class H as problem
H. Each hypothesis h P H is a mapping from T “ T1 ˆ T2 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Tn to r0, 1s, where Ti Ď R is the
domain of the i-th coordinate of the data type. We will refer to n as the data dimension of the
problem, to make a distinction with various learning dimensions in the literature which measure
the complexity of the hypothesis class. For a concrete running example, readers may think of
T1 “ T2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ Tn “ r0, 1s. For any data type t P T, and any hypothesis h P H, hptq is the reward
obtained by hypothesis h on a data point of type t.
Given a distribution D over T, we seek to pick a hypothesis h to maximize the expected reward:
h
`
D
˘ def“ Et„D“h`t˘‰ .
Further, let OptH
`
D
˘
denote the optimal expected reward. We will omit the subscript H for
brevity when the hypothesis class is clear from the context.
OptH
`
D
˘ def“ sup
hPH
h
`
D
˘
.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that D “ D1ˆD2ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆDn is a product distribution,
as it is a standard assumption in all examples considered in the paper. See Section 2.2 for details.
A learning algorithm for a problem H takes N i.i.d. samples from the underlying distribution
D as input and returns a hypothesis h P H. Let Ei denote the uniform distribution over the i-th
coordinate of the samples. We call E “ E1 ˆE2 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆEn the product empirical distribution, and
its optimal hypothesis hE the product empirical reward maximizer (PERM).
For any 0 ď ǫ ď 1, a hypothesis h is an ǫ-additive approximation if:
h
`
D
˘ ě Opt`D˘´ ǫ .
The sample complexity of a problemH is the minimum number of samples N for which there is a
learning algorithm so that, for any distribution D, it takes N i.i.d. samples and returns an ǫ-additive
approximation with probability at least 1´ δ. The sample complexity bounds in this paper depend
on the data dimension n, the approximation parameter ǫ, and the confidence parameter δ. In our
first set of results, they further depend on the sizes of the data type domain Ti’s. Importantly, they
are independent of any complexity measure of the hypothesis class H.
4Concurrently and independently, Fu and Lin [15] also proved an O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
upper bound for Pandora’s problem.
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2.2 Examples
Next, we define several example problems for which the theory developed in this paper improves
or matches the state-of-the-art sample complexity bounds. We define each problem only with the
minimum detail necessary for verifying that it is a special case of the above model. In particular, we
intentionally do not characterize the optimal hypothesis to stress the main feature of our theory: it
requires almost no knowledge of the hypothesis class; instead, it only needs that (1) D is a product
distribution, and (2) some generic structural property, e.g., the data type domain can be discretized,
or the problem satisfies strong monotonicity, which will be discussed in more details in Section 4.
Single-parameter Revenue Maximization. For simplicity of exposition, we use single-item
auctions with n bidders as the running example. Each bidder i has a type ti P r0, 1s that represents
its value for the item, and is drawn independently from Di. An auction A maps any type profile t
to an allocation x P r0, 1sn, }x}1 ď 1, and a payment vector p P r0, 1sn. For any bidder i, xi is the
probability that the bidder gets the item, and pi is its payment. Its utility equals xiti ´ pi.
A bidder’s type is private information known only to itself; therefore, the auctioneer must
ask the bidders to report the values. Hence, the literature focuses on dominant-strategy incentive
compatible (DSIC) auctions, which ensure that for any bidder, reporting the value truthfully always
maximizes its utility. The goal is to pick a DSIC auction to maximize the expected revenue. Readers
are referred to Myerson [26] for a characterization of the revenue optimal auction.
To place it in our framework, define the hypothesis class H by having a hypothesis hA for every
DSIC auction A, such that hAptq equals the revenue of auction A on a type profile t.
Readers who are familiar with auction theory may verify that the techniques in Section 3 apply
to arbitrary single-parameter problems, and those in Section 4 apply to the matroid setting.5
Multi-parameter Revenue Maximization. For simplicity of exposition, we use single-bidder
auctions with n items as the running example. Section 3 will discuss the extension to multi-bidder
multi-item auctions. The bidder has a type t P r0, 1sn such that ti is its value for item i, and is
drawn independently from Di. There are various settings with different definitions of the bidder’s
value for subsets of items. The most-studied ones are the unit-demand bidder, whose value for a
subset of items is the maximum value for a single item in the subset, and the additive bidder, whose
value is the sum of item values it gets. An auction A maps any type t to a subset of items to be
allocated to the bidder and its payment. The bidder’s utility is equal to its value for the allocated
subset minus the payment. The goal is to pick a DSIC auction to maximize the expected revenue.
Readers are referred to Cai et al. [9] for an LP-based characterization of the optimal auction.
Similar to the single-parameter setting, define the hypothesis class H by having a hypothesis
hA for every DSIC auction A, such that hAptq equals the revenue of auction A on type t.
Prophet Inequality. Consider n rewards which arrive one at a time; each reward ti P r0, 1s is
drawn independently from Di. On observing each reward, the algorithm must immediately decide
whether to take it or not; it can take at most one reward. The goal is to maximize the expected
reward. Readers are referred to Samuel-Cahn [32] for an algorithm that gets at least a half of the
expected max reward, and Correa et al. [11] for an improved algorithm in the case of i.i.d. rewards
that gets a 0.745 fraction of the expected max reward. Some readers may know it as the optimal
stopping problem, while it is often known as prophet inequality in theoretical computer science.
5This part of our results rely on a notion called strong revenue monotonicity, which we will discuss in more details
in Section 4. It is only known to hold in the matroid setting. Whether it further generalizes is an open problem.
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To put it in our framework, define the hypothesis class H by having a hypothesis hA for every
algorithm A, such that hAptq equals what the algorithm gets when the reward sequence is t.
Pandora’s Problem. Consider n boxes; each box i has a reward ti P r0, 1s drawn from Di and a
fixed cost ci P r0, 1s for opening it. In each round, the algorithm decides if to take the best observed
reward, or to open a new box. The goal is to maximize the reward it gets minus the total cost.
To interpret it in the our framework, define the hypothesis class H by having a hypothesis hA
for every algorithm A. If we let hAptq equals what the algorithm gets minus the cost when the
reward sequence is t, its range would be r´n, 1s instead of r0, 1s. In the main text, we use a simple
normalization, which let hA be the above value plus n and scaled by
1
n`1 . Appendix C.4 presents
a more specialized method that gives the tight sample complexity bound.
2.3 Metrics for Probability Distributions
Consider two distributions P,Q over a sample domain T . For concreteness, think of T as a cube
in the Euclidean space, e.g., r0, 1s or r0, 1sn.
Total Variation Distance. The total variation distance is a half of the L1 distance:
δ
`
P,Q
˘ “ 1
2
}P ´Q}1 . (1)
The following useful fact about total variation distance follows by its definition.
Lemma 1. For any distributions P,Q over a sample domain T , and any function h : T ÞÑ r0, 1s:ˇˇ
h
`
P
˘´ h`Q˘ˇˇ ď δ`P,Q˘ .
Recall that we are interested in multi-dimensional product distributions. It is hard to directly
measure the total variation distance among such distributions. The standard method is to instead
consider either the Kullback-Leibler divergence or the Hellinger distance; they are both additive in
that we can account for the distance in each coordinate separately, and both can be related to the
total variation distance. This paper uses the latter because it has better properties.
Hellinger Distance. The Hellinger distance between P and Q, denoted as H
`
P,Q
˘
, is given by:
H2
`
P,Q
˘ “ 1
2
ż
T
`?
dP ´
a
dQ
˘2
.
More formally, for any measure λ over T so that both P and Q are absolutely continuous w.r.t.
λ, let dP
dλ
and dQ
dλ
be the Radon-Nikodym derivatives. We have:
H2
`
P,Q
˘ “ 1
2
ż
T
ˆc
dP
dλ
´
c
dQ
dλ
˙2
dλ .
For example, if P and Q are continuous over r0, 1s with density functions p and q, or if P and
Q are distributions over a discrete set T with probability mass functions p and q, we have:
H2
`
P,Q
˘ “ 1
2
ż 1
0
`a
pptq ´
a
qptq˘2dt or H2`P,Q˘ “ 1
2
ÿ
tPT
`a
pptq ´
a
qptq˘2 .
The next two lemmas relate the Hellinger distance with the total variation distance, and for-
malize its additivity. Readers are referred to Gibbs and Su [16] for details of these properties and
a comprehensive discussion on different metrics for probability distributions.
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Lemma 2. Suppose P and Q are distributions over a sample domain T . Then, we have:
H2
`
P,Q
˘ ď δ`P,Q˘ ď ?2H`P,Q˘ .
Lemma 3. Suppose P and Q are product distributions over T “ T1 ˆ T2 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Tn. Then:
1´H2`P,Q˘ “ nź
i“1
`
1´H2`Pi, Qi˘˘ .
2.4 Vector Concentration Inequality
We will use the following Bernstein-style concentration inequality that bounds the ℓ2-norm of the
sum of independent random vectors.
Lemma 4 (Equation 6.12 of [23]). Let X1,X2, . . . ,XN be i.i.d. random vectors in R
d such that
E
“}Xi}22‰ ď σ2, and }Xi}2 ďM for some constant M ą 0. Then, for any positive ∆:
Pr
” ˇˇˇ››řN
i“1Xi
››
2
´ E“››řNi“1Xi››2‰
ˇˇˇ
ą ∆
ı
ď 2 exp
´
´ ∆2
2Nσ2
`
2´ expp2M∆
Nσ2
q˘¯ .
3 Problems with Finite (Discretized) Domain
3.1 General Sample Complexity Bounds
This section offers a theory of generalization for arbitrary hypotheses with finite domain.
Theorem 1. For any distribution D on T such that |Ti| ď k for all 1 ď i ď n, suppose for some
sufficiently large constant C ą 0, the number of samples is at least:
C ¨ nk
ǫ2
log
1
δ
Then, with probability at least 1´ δ, for any h : TÑ r0, 1s, we have:ˇˇ
hpDq ´ hpEqˇˇ ď ǫ .
In particular, the PERM is an ǫ-additive approximation.
The proof is simple in hindsight. The key is bounding the convergence of the product empirical
distribution to the true distribution in term of the Hellinger distance, as in the next lemma.
Lemma 5. With probability at least 1´ δ:
H2pD,Eq “ O
ˆ
nk
N
log
1
δ
˙
.
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 1 assuming the correctness of the lemma, whose proof
is deferred to the end of the section.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 5 and the stated number of samples, with probability at least 1´δ:
H2pD,Eq ď ǫ
2
2
.
Further by Lemma 2, we have:
δpD,Eq ď
?
2 ¨HpD,Eq ď ǫ .
Then, the theorem follows by Lemma 1.
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We complement Theorem 1 with a matching lower bound up to a logarithmic factor. The proof
is deferred to Appendix A.
Theorem 2. There is a problem H on a finite domain T with |Ti| “ k for all 1 ď i ď n, such that
no algorithm gives an expected ǫ-additive approximation if the number of samples is less than:
c ¨ nk
ǫ2
,
for a sufficiently small constant c ą 0.
3.2 Applications
Although some problems are defined on continuous domains, most can be discretized, including all
examples defined in Section 2.2. Observe that by rounding each sample to the closest discretized
value, we effectively sample from the discretized distribution. Next we discuss the applications
of Theorem 1 on the examples; the discretization arguments are either from previous works, or
deferred to the appendix because they do not provide much insight. While some results will be
subsumed by those in the next section, they are already comparable with the state-of-the-art in
meaningful ways. We restress that our bounds are obtained knowing effectively nothing about the
problems other than that the domains can be discretized, while previous works generally rely on
detailed problem structures. We believe the same approach can be applied to other problems not
covered in this paper.
Single-parameter Revenue Maximization. Devanur et al. [14] showed that we may w.l.o.g.
round values down to multiples of ǫ in single-parameter revenue maximization if the target is
an Opǫq-additive approximation. Hence, with k “ 1
ǫ
, Theorem 1 matches the previous results by
Morgenstern and Roughgarden [25], Devanur et al. [14], and Syrgkanis [34] discussed in Section 1.1,
i.e., the best bounds before the recent work of Guo et al. [19]. In fact, our bound is better in the
logarithmic factors.
Theorem 3. In a single-item auction with n bidders whose values are bounded in r0, 1s, the sample
complexity is at most O
`
n
ǫ3
log 1
δ
˘
.
Multi-parameter Revenue Maximization. We consider the case for selling n-items to a unit-
demand (resp., additive) bidder. It is known that rounding the item values down to multiples of ǫ2
(resp., ǫ2{n) for a unit-demand (resp. additive) bidder is w.l.o.g. due to a reduction from approx-
imate DSIC auctions to DSIC auctions, which states any ǫ2-DSIC mechanism can be transformed
into a DSIC mechanism with at most ǫ loss in revenue (see, e.g., Balcan et al. [2], attributed to
Nisan). Therefore, Theorem 1 gives the following bounds that improve the best known results by
Gonczarowski and Weinberg [18] in the log factor.
Theorem 4. In a multi-item auction with n items and a unit-demand bidder whose values are
bounded in r0, 1s, the sample complexity is at most O` n
ǫ4
log 1
δ
˘
.
Theorem 5. In a multi-item auction with n items and an additive bidder whose values are bounded
in r0, 1s, the sample complexity is at most O`n2
ǫ4
log 1
δ
˘
.6
6In the additive case, the optimal revenue is bounded by r0, ns. The stated bound is an ǫ-approximation w.r.t. the
normalized revenue divided by a factor 1
n
. The bound would be O˜
`
n4
ǫ4
˘
for an ǫ-approximation without normalization.
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Multiple Bidders. For n-bidder m-item auctions, Theorem 1 gives an O˜
`
mnk
ǫ2
˘
bound if the
buyers’ value domains are finite with size k, improving those by Gonczarowski and Weinberg [18]
in the log factor. For continuous value domains, however, there is no existing transformation from
approximate DSIC to DSIC auctions in this more general setting; as a result, the aforementioned
discretization no longer works. Either we settle with approximate DSIC auctions, or need to know
more about the relation between approximate and exact DSIC auctions, which is a fundamental
question on its own in auction theory. Readers are referred to Gonczarowski and Weinberg [18] for
an extensive discussion on this topic.
Prophet Inequality. We show that the rewards in prophet inequality can be discretized w.l.o.g.
to multiples of ǫ. Hence, letting k “ 1
ǫ
, we get a sample complexity bound that improves the
recent work of Correa et al. [12] in the dependence in n, and the concurrent result by Rubinstein
et al. [31] in the dependence in ǫ, with bounded rewards in r0, 1s and additive approximation. The
discretization argument and an extension to the original setting of Correa et al. [12] with unbounded
rewards and multiplicative approximation is deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 6. In the prophet inequality setting with n items whose rewards are bounded in r0, 1s,
the sample complexity is at most O
`
n
ǫ3
log 1
δ
˘
.
Pandora’s Problem. Recall that the main text uses a simple normalization by a factor 1
n`1 to
ensure that the hypotheses in Pandora’s problem has range r0, 1s. Hence, to get an ǫ-approximation
w.r.t. Pandora’s problem, we need a ǫ
n`1 -approximately optimal hypothesis. Further, we show
that the rewards can be w.l.o.g. discretized to multiples of ǫ. Putting together, we get the first
polynomial sample complexity for Pandora’s problem. The discretization argument and a more
specialized method that gives the optimal sample complexity are deferred to Appendix C.
Theorem 7. In the Pandora’s problem with n boxes whose rewards and costs are bounded in r0, 1s,
the sample complexity is at most O
`
n3
ǫ3
log 1
δ
˘
.
3.3 Convergence of Product Empirical Distribution: Proof of Lemma 5
We will reduce the problem to a vector concentration inequality. First:
1´H2pD,Eq “
nź
i“1
`
1´H2pDi, Eiq
˘
(Lemma 3)
ě 1´
nÿ
i“1
H2pDi, Eiq .
Hence, it suffices to show that with probability at least 1´ δ:
nÿ
i“1
H2pDi, Eiq ď O
ˆ
nk
N
log
1
δ
˙
. (2)
By definition, for any 1 ď i ď n:
H2pDi, Eiq “ 1
2
ÿ
tPTi
´b
fDiptq ´
b
fEiptq
¯2 “ 1
2
ÿ
tPTi
˜
fDiptq ´ fEiptqa
fDiptq `
a
fEiptq
¸2
.
Next, bound the right-hand-side with the following inequality, which can be viewed a smoothed
variant of the connection between the Hellinger distance and χ-square distance.
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Lemma 6. For any fD, fE ě 0:ˆ
fD ´ fE?
fD `
?
fE
˙2
ď
`
fD ´ fE
˘2
max
 
fD,
1
N
log 1
δ
( ` 1
N
log
1
δ
.
Proof. If fE ą 1N log 1δ or fD ą 1N log 1δ , the left-hand-side is at most the first term on the right-
hand-side. Otherwise, the left-hand-side is at most maxtfD, fEu ď 1N logp1δ q.
Sum Eqn. (2) over 1 ď i ď n, and apply Lemma 6 to the right-hand-side:
nÿ
i“1
H2pDi, Eiq ď 1
2
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
tPTi
`
fDiptq ´ fEiptq
˘2
max
 
fDiptq, 1N log 1δ
( ` nk
N
log
1
δ
.
Therefore, it suffices to show that with probability at least 1´ δ:
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
tPTi
`
fDiptq ´ fEiptq
˘2
max
 
fDiptq, 1N log 1δ
( ď Oˆnk
N
log
1
δ
˙
. (3)
To interpret the left-hand-side as the squared ℓ2-norm of the sum of i.i.d. vectors, we associate
each sample sj „ D, 1 ď j ď N , with a
řn
i“1 |Ti|-dimensional random vector Xj. Concretely, for
any j P rN s, i P rns and t P Ti:
Xjit “ 1rsji “ ts ´ fDiptqb
max
 
fDiptq, 1N log 1δ
( .
Then, Eqn. (3) can be restated as:
››› 1
N
Nÿ
j“1
Xj
›››2
2
ď O
ˆ
nk
N
log
1
δ
˙
, or equivalently
››› Nÿ
j“1
Xj
›››2
2
ď O
ˆ
Nnk log
1
δ
˙
.
We establish the following properties of the random vectors.
Lemma 7. The i.i.d. random vectors Xj, 1 ď j ď N , satisfy (1) E
“
Xj
‰ “ 0, (2) E“}Xj}22‰ ď nk,
and (3) }Xj}2 ď
b
Nnk
log 1
δ
.
Proof. The first property follows by definition. The second one is true because:
E
“}Xj}22‰ ď nÿ
i“1
ÿ
tPTi
E
“p1rsji “ ts ´ fDiptqq2‰
fDiptq
“
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
tPTi
p1´ fDiptqq ď nk .
The last property follows by Xijk ď N{ log 1δ . This is why we need the smoothed variant in
Lemma 6 instead of the original inequality between the Hellinger and χ-square distances.
By Lemma 7, and Lemma 4 with σ2 “ 128nk,7 M “
b
Nnk{ log 1
δ
, and ∆ “ 16
b
Nnk log 1
δ
,
we get that with probability at least 1´ δ:
ˇˇˇ
ˇ ›››
Nÿ
j“1
Xj
›››
2
´ E
”››› Nÿ
j“1
Xj
›››
2
ı ˇˇˇˇ ď O
ˆc
Nnk log
1
δ
˙
.
7We need the additional constant 128 in σ2 because the right-hand-side of Lemma 4 is not monotone in σ2.
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Finally, it remains to bound the expected ℓ2-norm of
řN
j“1Xj:
E
”››› Nÿ
j“1
Xj
›››
2
ı2 ď E”››› ÿ
jPrNs
Xj
›››2
2
ı
(Cauchy-Schwarz)
“
Nÿ
j“1
E
”››Xj››22
ı
(independence of Xj’s, and E
“
Xj
‰ “ 0 by Lemma 7)
ď Nnk . (E“}Xj}22‰ ď nk by Lemma 7)
4 Strongly Monotone Problems
This section considers the sample complexity of a subset of problems which satisfy a structural
property called strong monotonicity, without any restrictions on the supports of the data domain.
Definition 1 (Strong Monotonicity). A problem H is strongly monotone if for any D, any D˜ that
is stochastically dominated by D, and the optimal hypothesis h
D˜
of D˜:
h
D˜
`
D
˘ ě h
D˜
`
D˜
˘ “ Opt`D˜˘ .
The name is inherited from the context of single-parameter revenue maximization, where each
hypothesis h is a DSIC auction, v „ D is the value profile, and hpDq is the expected revenue of the
auction over the random realization of a value profile drawn from D. Then, the above inequality
states that running the optimal auction w.r.t. D˜, a.k.a., Myerson’s auction, on a distribution D
that stochastically dominates D˜, gets at least the optimal revenue w.r.t. the dominated distribution
D˜. This is precisely the notion of strong revenue monotonicity introduced by Devanur et al. [14].
The naming is to make a distinction with the existing weaker notion of revenue monotonicity, which
only requires that optimal revenue w.r.t. D to be weakly larger than that w.r.t. D˜. We restate
below the weaker notion in the more general context in this paper.
Definition 2. A problem H is weakly monotone if for any D, and any D˜ that is stochastically
dominated by D:
Opt
`
D
˘ ě Opt`D˜˘ .
Finally, we remark that there is an even stronger notion of monotonicity which we call hypothesis-
wise monotonicity.
Definition 3. A problem H is hypothesis-wise monotone if for any D P Rn, any D˜ P Rn that is
stochastically dominated by D, and any hypothesis h P H:
h
`
D
˘ ě h`D˜˘ .
Clearly, hypothesis-wise monotonicity implies strong monotonicity, which in turns implies weak
monotonicity. Weak monotonicity is insufficient for deriving the improved sample complexity bound
with the techniques in this section. Hypothesis-wise monotonicity is too restrictive on the other
hand; in fact, it fails to hold on any example considered in this paper.
The rest of the section argues that (1) strong monotonicity leads to an improved sample com-
plexity bound, and (2) strong monotonicity holds in all but one examples considered in this paper,
improving or matching the state-of-the-art sample complexity bounds.
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4.1 Sample Complexity Bounds for Strongly Monotone Problems
The main result for strongly monotone problems is the following improved sample complexity upper
bound. In particular, the bound is independent of the support size of the distributions and, in fact,
applies to continuous distributions.
Theorem 8. For any strongly monotone problem H, suppose the number of samples is at least:
C ¨ n
ǫ2
log
´n
ǫ
¯
log
´ n
ǫδ
¯
,
where C ą 0 is a sufficiently large constant independent of the problem H. Then, the PERM is an
ǫ-additive approximation with probability at least 1´ δ.
Remark: If the distributions are i.i.d., i.e., Di “ D˚ for any i P rns, it suffices to have the above
number of sample values from D˚ (rather than vectors from D) and construct an i.i.d. empirical
distribution E such that each coordinate is a uniform distribution over the samples.
The above upper bound is identical to that in the special case of single-parameter revenue max-
imization by Guo et al. [19]; the proof is also similar. The contributions of this paper are two-folds.
First, we generalize it to arbitrary strongly monotone problems so that it can be further applied to
a broader scope of problems, including the prophet inequalities and the Pandora’s problem consid-
ered in this paper. Second, we show that the empirical maximizer itself achieves the optimal sample
complexity bound when the reward function is bounded in r0, 1s; in contrast, Guo et al. [19] need a
regularized version of the empirical distributions called the dominated empirical distributions, and
uses the corresponding regularized maximizer.
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 8, we remark that the above upper bound is tight up
to a poly-logarithmic factor, due to an existing lower bound in the special case of single-parameter
revenue maximization.
Theorem 9. There is a strongly monotone problem H so that if the number of samples is less than:
c ¨ n
ǫ2
,
where c ą 0 is a sufficiently small constant, no algorithm gets an expected ǫ-additive approximation.
Proof. LetH be the set of DSIC single-item auctions with n bidders. Restrict the bidders’ valuations
to be bounded in r0, 1s so that the value/revenue of any hypothesis/auction h P H on any value
profile is bounded in r0, 1s. By Devanur et al. [14], the single-item revenue maximization problem is
strongly monotone. Further by Guo et al. [19], the sample complexity of r0, 1s-bounded valuations
and ǫ-additive approximation is at least Ωp n
ǫ2
q.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 8
By the Bernstein inequality and union bound, we can relate the CDFs of underlying distribution
D and the empirical distribution E as follows.
Lemma 8 (e.g., Lemma 5 of Guo et al. [19]). With probability at least 1´ δ, we have that for any
i P rns, and any ti P r0, 1s:
ˇˇ
FDiptiq ´ FEiptiq
ˇˇ ď
d
2FDiptiq
`
1´ FDiptiq
˘
lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
` lnp2Nnδ
´1q
N
.
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The rest of the subsection shows the stated additive approximation factor under the assumption
that the inequality in Lemma 8 holds.
We introduce two auxiliary distribution Dˆ and Dˇ, where the former serves as an upper bound
of E and the latter as a lower bound. Concretely, for any i P rns, define the CDF of Dˆi as follows:
F
Dˆi
`
ti
˘ “
$&
%
1 xi “ 1 ;
max
"
0, FDiptiq ´
b
2FDiptiqp1´FDi ptiqq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
´ lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
*
0 ď xi ă 1 .
(4)
The case of xi “ 1 is defined separately because its CDF must be 1 for any distribution with
support bounded in r0, 1s. The other cases are defined to be the smallest possible value of FEi
`
xi
˘
according to Lemma 8 and the trivial lower bound of FEi
`
xi
˘ ě 0.
Similarly, for any i P rns, define the CDF of Dˇi as follows:
FDˇi
`
ti
˘ “
$&
%
0 xi “ 0 ;
min
"
1, FDiptiq `
b
2FDiptiqp1´FDi ptiqq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
` lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
*
0 ă xi ď 1 .
(5)
Then, the empirical distribution is sandwiched between the auxiliary distributions by definition.
Lemma 9. Assuming the inequality in Lemma 8, we have:
Dˆ ľ E ľ Dˇ .
Therefore, we can lower bound the performance of the empirical maximizer, i.e., hE, on the
underlying distribution D through a sequence of inequalities below:
hE
`
D
˘ ě hE`Dˆ˘´ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (hE bounded in r0, 1s, Lemma 1)
ě hE
`
E
˘´ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (strong monotonicity, Dˆ ľ E)
“ Opt`E˘´ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (definition of Opt`E˘)
ě Opt`Dˇ˘´ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (weak monotonicity, E ľ Dˇ)
ě hD
`
Dˇ
˘´ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (definition of Opt`Dˇ˘)
ě hD
`
D
˘´ δ`Dˇ,D˘ ´ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (hD bounded in r0, 1s, Lemma 1)
“ Opt`D˘´ δ`Dˇ,D˘´ δ`Dˆ,D˘ . (definition of Opt`D˘)
Therefore, it remains to show that with the number of samples stated in the theorem:
δ
`
Dˇ,D
˘ ď ǫ
2
, δ
`
Dˆ,D
˘ ď ǫ
2
. (6)
By Lemma 2, it suffices to upper bound the Hellinger distances, as in the following lemmas.
Lemma 10. For any distribution D and the corresponding Dˆ defined in Eqn. (4), we have:
H2
`
Dˆ,D
˘ ď Oˆ n
N
log
ˆ
Nn
δ
˙
log
ˆ
N
logpNnδ´1q
˙˙
.
Lemma 11. For any distribution D and the corresponding Dˇ defined in Eqn. (5), we have:
H2
`
Dˇ,D
˘ ď Oˆ n
N
log
ˆ
Nn
δ
˙
log
ˆ
N
logpNnδ´1q
˙˙
.
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The proofs of the above lemmas, which we include at the end of the subsection for completeness,
are analogous to the proof of a similar lemma w.r.t. Kullback-Leibler divergence by Guo et al. [19].
The main difference is that the lemma by Guo et al. [19] requires additional conditions that lower
bound the probability masses of the two endpoints of the support, while ours do not.
As corollaries of the lemma, with a number of samples stated in the lemma, we have:
H2
`
Dˆ,D
˘ ď ǫ2
8
, H2
`
Dˇ,D
˘ ď ǫ2
8
.
Putting together with Lemma 2 proves Eqn. (6), which finishes the proof of Theorem 8.
Proof of Lemma 10 and Lemma 11. By symmetry, it suffices to prove one of them. Below we prove
Lemma 10.
For simplicity of notations in this proof, let Γ “ lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
be the coefficient that appears in
the definition of Dˆ, i.e., Eqn. (4). Further define:
gpyq “ y ´
a
2Γ ¨ yp1´ yq ´ Γ .
Then, Eqn. (4) can be written as:
F
Dˆi
ptq “
#
1 x “ 1 ;
max
 
0, g
`
FDiptq
˘(
0 ď x ă 1 . (7)
Further, the inequality in the lemma can be written as:
H2
`
Dˆ,D
˘ ď OˆnΓ log 1
Γ
˙
,
or equivalently:
1´H2`Dˆ,D˘ ě 1´OˆnΓ log 1
Γ
˙
.
By Lemma 3, we have:
1´H2`Dˆ,D˘ “ nź
i“1
`
1´H2`Dˆi,Di˘˘ .
Hence, it suffices to show that for any i P rns:
1´H2`Dˆi,Di˘ ě 1´O
ˆ
Γ log
1
Γ
˙
,
or equivalently:
H2
`
Dˆi,Di
˘ ď OˆΓ log 1
Γ
˙
.
By definition, the squared Hellinger distance is:
H2
`
Dˆi,Di
˘ “ 1
2
ż
xPr0,1s
ˆb
dFDipxq ´
b
dF
Dˆi
pxq
˙2
. (8)
We shall partition r0, 1s into three subsets based on how the CDF of Dˆi is defined in Eqn. (7):
(a) the values whose F
Dˆi
ptq “ 0, (b) x “ 1 whose F
Dˆi
ptq “ 1, and (c) the rest of the values whose
0 ă F
Dˆi
ptq ă 1. Then, we account for their contributions to Eqn. (8) separately.
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Part (a). Consider the values whose CDF is 0 w.r.t. Dˆi. To formally define this subset of values,
recall that gpyq “ y ´a2Γ ¨ yp1´ yq ´ Γ. Let Fℓ P r0, 1s be the unique solution for:
gpFℓq “ 0 .
The value of gpFℓq is strictly less than 0 when Fℓ “ Γ, and is strictly greater than 0 when
Fℓ “ 4Γ. Hence, we have:
Γ ă Fℓ ă 4Γ . (9)
Let ℓ be the minimum value whose CDF is at least Fℓ, i.e.:
ℓ “ inf  x : FDiptq ě Fℓ( .
Then, for values in r0, ℓq, we have F
Dˆi
ptq “ 0 and therefore:
1
2
ż
tPr0,ℓq
ˆb
dFDiptq ´
b
dF
Dˆi
ptq
˙2
“ lim
tÑℓ´
1
2
FDiptq
ď 1
2
Fℓ (definition of ℓ)
ă 2Γ . (Eqn. (9))
Part (b). For simplicity of notations, let fp1q “ fDip1q and fˆp1q “ fDˆip1q be the probability
that x “ 1 in Di and Dˆi respectively. We have:
fˆp1q “ 1´ lim
tÑ1´
F
Dˆi
ptq
“ 1´ lim
tÑ1´
ˆ
FDiptq ´
b
2Γ ¨ FDiptq
`
1´ FDiptq
˘ ´ Γ˙ (Eqn. (7))
“ fp1q `
b
2Γ ¨ fp1q`1´ fp1q˘` Γ .
As corollaries, we have:
fˆp1q ě max  fp1q,Γ( ,
and: `
fˆp1q ´ fp1q˘2 “ Γ ¨ `b2fp1q`1´ fp1q˘`?Γ˘2
ď Γ ¨ `a2fp1q ` ?Γ˘2
ď Γ ¨max  fp1q,Γ( .
Using the above two inequalities, the contribution from x “ 1 is at most:
1
2
`a
fp1q ´
b
fˆp1q˘2 “ 1
2
`
fˆp1q ´ fp1q˘2`a
fp1q `
b
fˆp1q˘2
ď
`
fˆp1q ´ fp1q˘2
2fˆp1q
ď Γ
2
.
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Part (c). It remains to bound the contribution from values t P rℓ, 1q. By Eqn. (7) and the
definition of ℓ, the CDF w.r.t. Dˆi of any value in this range is defined by a continuous mapping:
F
Dˆi
ptq “ g`FDiptq˘ .
Therefore, the CDFs w.r.t. Di and Dˆi have the same set of discontinuities in this range, i.e.,
the same set of point masses. We will first bound the contribution of values in rℓ, 1q under the
assumption that both Di and Dˆi are continuous in this range. Then, we will demonstrate how to
generalize the result to arbitrary distributions by handling the common point masses appropriately.
Under the assumption of continuity, the contribution to the Hellinger distance by this part is:
1
2
ż
tPrℓ,1q
ˆb
dFDiptq ´
b
dF
Dˆi
ptq
˙2
“ 1
2
ż
tPrℓ,1q
ˆd
dF
Dˆiptq
dFDiptq
´ 1
˙2
dFDiptq
“ 1
2
ż
tPrℓ,1q
ˆb
g1
`
FDiptq
˘ ´ 1˙2dFDiptq .
By the definition of g, we have:
g1pyq “ 1` p2y ´ 1q
?
Γb
2y
`
1´ y˘ .
Therefore, it suffices to upper bound the following integral:ż 1
Fℓ
ˆc
1` p2y´1q
?
Γ?
2yp1´yq ´ 1
˙2
dy
We will bound it in rFℓ, 1´ Γq and r1´ Γ, 1s separately. The former is at most:ż 1´Γ
Fℓ
ˆd
1` p2y´1q
?
Γb
2y
`
1´y
˘ ´ 1˙2dy ď ż 1´Γ
Fℓ
p2y ´ 1q2Γ
2y
`
1´ y˘ dy (
ˇˇ?
1` x´ 1ˇˇ ď ˇˇxˇˇ)
ď
ż 1´Γ
Fℓ
Γ
2y
`
1´ y˘dy (0 ď y ď 1)
“ Γ
2
ˆ
ln
1´ Γ
Fℓ
` ln 1´ Fℓ
Γ
˙
ď Γ
2
ˆ
ln
1
Fℓ
` ln 1
Γ
˙
ă Γ ln 1
Γ
. (Eqn. (9)) .
For the latter, it is upper bounded by:ż 1
1´Γ
ˆd
1` p2y´1q
?
Γb
2y
`
1´y
˘ ´ 1˙2dy ď ż 1
1´Γ
p2y´1q?Γb
2y
`
1´y
˘dy (?1` x´ 1 ď ?x for x ą 0)
“
a
2p1´ ΓqΓ
ď
?
2Γ .
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Combining the upper bounds of the integrals over the two intervals, the contribution from part
(c) under the assumption of continuity is at most O
`
Γ log 1
Γ
˘
.
Finally, consider any point mass t˚ in the two distributions Di and Dˆi. Let y¯ “ FDipt˚q and
y “ limtÑt˚´ FDiptq. Then, the probability mass of t˚ w.r.t. Di is y¯ ´ y, and that w.r.t. Dˆi is
gpy¯q ´ gpyq. Hence, the contribution of t˚ to the Hellinger distance is:
1
2
ˆa
y¯ ´ y ´
b
gpy¯q ´ gpyq
˙2
“ 1
2
ˆd
gpy¯q ´ gpyq
y¯ ´ y ´ 1
˙2`
y¯ ´ y˘
“ 1
2
ˆd
1
y¯ ´ y
ż y¯
y
g1pyqdy ´ 1
˙2`
y¯ ´ y˘
ď 1
2
ż y¯
y
ˆa
g1pyq ´ 1
˙2
dy .
The last inequality follows by the convexity of p?x ´ 1q2 and Jensen’s inequality. The RHS
is precisely the contribution by values with CDF in py, y¯s in the continuous case. Therefore, by
applying this argument to all point masses, we reduce the problem to the continuous case.
4.3 Applications
Single-parameter Revenue Maximization. As we have discussed at the beginning of the
section, strong monotonicity corresponds to strong revenue monotonicity in the context of single-
parameter revenue maximization, which is shown by Devanur et al. [14]. In particular, for single-
item auction, it follows from Theorem 8 that O˜pnǫ´2q samples are sufficient for getting an ǫ-additive
approximation when the bidders’ valuations are bounded in r0, 1s, matching the optimal bound by
Guo et al. [19]. The main difference compared with Guo et al. [19] lies in that we achieve the optimal
upper bound using the empirical maximizer, which corresponds to Myerson’s optimal auction w.r.t.
the empirical distributions, while Guo et al. [19] needs to apply appropriate regularization to the
empirical distribution and uses the corresponding regularized empirical Myerson’s auction.
Theorem 10. In a single-item auction with n bidders whose values are bounded in r0, 1s, suppose
the number of samples is at least:
C ¨ n
ǫ2
log
ˆ
n
ǫ
˙
log
ˆ
n
ǫδ
˙
for some sufficiently large constant C ą 0. Then, the empirical Myerson’s auction is an ǫ-additive
approximation with probability at least 1´ δ.
Prophet Inequality. In the context of prophet inequality, each hypothesis corresponds to a
sequence of thresholds, one for each round, such that the algorithm accepts the first reward that is
greater than or equal to the corresponding threshold. We show that this problem satisfies strong
monotonicity; the proof is deferred to Appendix B.3.
Lemma 12. The problem of prophet inequality is strongly monotone.
As a corollary of Lemma 12, Theorem 8, and the fact that the optimal thresholds achieve at
least one half of the expected max reward (e.g., Samuel-Cahn [32]),8 we get an O˜
`
nǫ´2
˘
sample
complexity upper bound.
8In fact, is it known that an appropriate fixed threshold can achieve at least one half of the expected max.
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Theorem 11. For any instance of prophet inequality in which the rewards are bounded in r0, 1s,
suppose the number of samples is at least:
C ¨ n
ǫ2
log
ˆ
n
ǫ
˙
log
ˆ
n
ǫδ
˙
for some sufficiently large constant C ą 0. Then, the expected reward by the empirically optimal
thresholds is an ǫ-additive approximation compared to the optimal thresholds and thus, is at least
half of the expected max reward minus ǫ.
Prophet Inequality for i.i.d. Rewards. If the rewards are i.i.d., Correa et al. [11] prove an
improved prophet inequality that achieves at least a 0.745 factor of the expected max reward. The
strong monotonicity of prophet inequality for i.i.d. rewards follows as a special case of Lemma 12.
Therefore, we get the same O˜
`
nǫ´2
˘
sample complexity upper bound, matching the lower bound
by Correa et al. [12].
Theorem 12. For any instance of prophet inequality with i.i.d. rewards bounded in r0, 1s, suppose
the number of sample rewards (rather than reward vectors) is at least:
C ¨ n
ǫ2
log
ˆ
n
ǫ
˙
log
ˆ
n
ǫδ
˙
for some sufficiently large constant C ą 0. Then, the expected reward by the empirically optimal
thresholds is an ǫ-additive approximation compared to the optimal thresholds and thus, is at least a
0.745 factor of the expected max reward minus ǫ.
As mentioned in Section 1, the setting of Correa et al. [12] is different from ours in that
they consider unbounded distributions and multiplicative approximation. Indeed, we focus on
bounded-support distributions and additive approximation in the main text of the paper in order to
develop a generalization theory that requires minimum knowledge of the structure of the problems.
Nonetheless, Appendix B.4 demonstrates how to combine the techniques in this paper and the
special structures of the prophet inequality with i.i.d. rewards to get the same O˜pnǫ´2q sample
complexity upper bound in the setting of Correa et al. [12], addressing an open problem therein.9
Pandora’s Problem. An algorithm for the Pandora’s problem is a mapping from the history of
observed rewards to either one of the unopened boxes, or the decision to stop and take the best
observed reward. Since the former has exponentially many possibilities even after discretization,
the na¨ıve upper bound on the size of the hypothesis class is doubly exponential. Nonetheless, we
show that the problem is strongly monotone, highlighting that strong monotonicity is a structural
property without any obvious connection to the complexity/simplicity of the hypothesis class. The
proof is deferred to Appendix C.3.
Lemma 13. Pandora’s problem is strongly monotone.
Recall that in Section 2 we use the simple treatment of defining the value of a hypothesis to be
the value of the corresponding algorithm plus n and then scaled by 1
n`1 to normalize its range to be
r0, 1s. Therefore, to get an ǫ-additive approximation in Pandora’s problem, we need a ǫ
n`1 -additive
approximation w.r.t. H. As a corollary of Lemma 13 and Theorem 8, we get an O˜pn3ǫ´2q sample
complexity bound. See Appendix C.4 for an analysis tailored for Pandora’s problem to get the
following optimal bound.
9It is explicitly stated as an open question in the talk at EC 2019.
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Theorem 13. For any instance of Pandora’s problem in which the rewards are bounded in r0, 1s,
suppose the number of samples is at least:
C ¨ n
ǫ2
log2
ˆ
1
ǫ
˙
log
ˆ
n
ǫ
˙
log
ˆ
n
ǫδ
˙
for some sufficiently large constant C ą 0. Then, we can learn an ǫ-additive approximate algorithm
from the samples. Further, to learn such an algorithm, the number of samples must be at least:
c ¨ n
ǫ2
for some sufficiently small constant c ą 0.
5 Classification Problems: a Preliminary Discussion
In classification problems, there is a special data dimension which corresponds to the labels; the
rest of the data dimensions correspond to the features. In particular, it is crucial that the labels are
correlated with the features. Therefore, the assumption of independent data dimensions fail to hold.
Nevertheless, below we present a straightforward extension of Theorem 1 under the assumption that
the distribution of features conditioned on any given label is a product distribution. Although this
preliminary result still relies on too strong an assumption to be useful in natural classification
problems, we hope that it will serve as a stepping stone for follow-up works. See Section 6 for some
related research directions.
The rest of the section follows the notations in classification problems and denotes each data
point as a feature-label pair px, yq, where x is the feature vector and y is the label. We assume that
there are ℓ labels rℓs “ t1, 2, . . . , ℓu. Let T “ śni“1 Ti denote an n-dimensional feature domain.
Hence, the data domain under the model in Section 2 is Tˆrℓs. Let DY denote the distribution of
labels. Further, for any label y P rℓs, let DX|y denote a product distribution of features conditioned
on having label y. For simplicity of notation, let DX denote the collection of conditional product
feature distributions, and write D “ DX ˝DY be the joint distribution of feature-label pairs. By
definition, the probability mass function of the joint distribution is:
fDpx, yq “ fDY pyq ¨ fDX|ypxq . (10)
We say that such a distribution has product conditional feature distributions.
Generalized Product Empirical Distribution. We now generalize the definition of product
empirical distribution to classification problems that have product conditional feature distributions.
Let the empirical distribution of labels EY be the uniform distribution over sample labels. Further,
for any label y P rℓs, let EX|y be the product empirical distribution w.r.t. the samples with label y.
Concretely, for any i P rns, let the i-th coordinate of EX|y be a uniform distribution over the i-th
coordinate of the samples with label y. As before, let EX denote the collection of product empirical
feature distributions conditioned on the labels. Finally, let E “ EX ˝EY .
By definition, the probability mass function of the joint distribution is:
fEpx, yq “ fEY pyq ¨ fEX|ypxq . (11)
Finally, we define the product empirical risk minimizer (PERM) to be the best hypothesis w.r.t.
E. Here, note that we seek to minimize the objective.
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Theorem 14. Let D “ DX ˝DY be any distribution with product conditional feature distributions,
over Tˆ rℓs such that |Ti| ď k for any 1 ď i ď n. For a sufficiently large constant C ą 0, suppose
the number of samples is at least:
C ¨ nkℓ
ǫ2
log
ˆ
ℓ
δ
˙
Then, with probability at least 1´ δ, for any h : Tˆ rℓs ÞÑ r0, 1s, we have:ˇˇ
hpDq ´ hpEqˇˇ ď ǫ .
In particular, the PERM is an ǫ-additive approximation.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we rely on Lemma 1. It suffices to show that:
δpD,Eq ď ǫ .
To do so, we first decompose it into two parts, the error due to the estimation of the label
distribution, and that due to the conditional feature distributions. By Eqn. (10) and Eqn. (11):
δpD,Eq “ 1
2
ÿ
yPrℓs
ÿ
xPT
ˇˇ
fDY pyq ¨ fDX|ypxq ´ fEypyq ¨ fEX|ypxq
ˇˇ
ď 1
2
ÿ
yPrℓs
ÿ
xPT
´ˇˇ
fDypyq ´ fEypyq
ˇˇ ¨ fDX|ypxq ` fEypyq ¨ ˇˇfDX|ypxq ´ fEX|ypxqˇˇ¯
“ δpDy , Eyq `
ÿ
yPrℓs
fEypyq ¨ δpDX|y ,EX|yq .
By Lemma 5 and the stated number of samples, the squared Hellinger distance between the
label distributions Dy and Ey is less than
ǫ2
8
. Further by the relation between the total variation
and Hellinger distances, i.e., Lemma 2, we get that the first term on the RHS above is at most ǫ
2
.
It remains to bound the second term, i.e., the error due to the estimation of the conditional
feature distributions. Fix any label y P rℓs. By definition, the number of samples with label y is
fEY pyqN . Therefore, by Lemma 5 and the stated number of samples, the squared Hellinger distance
between the feature distributions conditioned on y is at most:
H2pDX|y,EX|yq ď
ǫ2
8ℓfEY pyq
.
Further by Lemma 2, their total variation distance is at most:
δpDX|y,EX|yq ď
ǫ
2
¨ 1a
ℓfEY pyq
.
Hence, the second term is at most:
ÿ
yPrℓs
fEY pyq ¨ δpDX|y ,EX|yq ď
ÿ
yPrℓs
ǫ
2
¨
c
fEY pyq
ℓ
ď ǫ
2
.
The second inequality follows by
ř
yPrℓs fEY pyq “ 1 and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
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6 Future Directions and Other Related Works
Sample Complexity of Simple Auctions/Hypotheses. A branch of the literature of sample
complexity of auctions considers simpler auction formats such as the second-price auction with
reserve prices. Readers are referred to Balcan et al. [3], Cai and Daskalakis [8], and Morgenstern
and Roughgarden [24] for some examples. We restate that the theories developed in this paper are
complementary to the existing ones; they are more suitable for problems with complex hypothesis
classes (on product distributions). Hence, this paper does not try to apply the theories to these
simpler families of auctions. That said, there are relatively few natural hypothesis classes whose
“degrees-of-freedom” are smaller than the data dimensions. Hence, for strongly monotone problems,
the sample complexity bound in Theorem 8 is competitive. Finally, we leave as a future question
whether there are natural learning problems whose tight sample complexity bounds need both
complexity measures of the hypotheses and the independence of data dimensions.
Beyond Product Distributions. Although arbitrarily correlated distributions seem intractable,
it may be possible to generalize the theories in this paper to structured corrected distributions,
which we leave as another future direction. Concretely, if we can learn from samples an appropri-
ate representation of the data under which different dimensions are independent, we shall be able
to combine it with the theories in this paper to get generalization bounds. To this end, the vast
literature on principle component analysis (PCA) is related. See, e.g., Pearson [28] and Jolliffe [21].
Independently, Brustle et al. [7] made progress on this direction showing how to learn multi-item
auctions when the value distribution is correlated yet admit special structures.
Classification Problems. Section 5 presents a preliminary result under a strong assumption
that the feature distributions are independent conditioned on any given label. To further extend
the theories in this paper to obtain useful generalization bounds for natural classification problems,
we need to relax the assumption of having product conditional feature distributions, which is related
to the last research direction. Moreover, although the algorithmic question of finding the optimal
hypothesis w.r.t. a product distribution is well-studied for optimization problems in the Bayesian
model, little is known about its counterpart for classification problems. In particular, it is unclear
whether finding the best hypothesis w.r.t. the product empirical distribution is harder or easier than
doing so w.r.t. the original notion of empirical distribution. On the one hand, the product empirical
distribution is more structured; on the other hand, its support size is exponential in general, while
the support size of the original empirical distribution is upper bounded by the number of samples.
Multi-parameter Auctions and Other Structural Properties. Multi-parameter revenue
maximization is the only example in this paper that does not benefit from the improved sample
complexity bound in Theorem 8 because it is not strong monotonicity. In fact, Hart and Reny [20]
showed that it is not even weakly monotone. Nonetheless, the hypotheses corresponding to multi-
parameter auctions are very different from those used in the proof of the lower bound (Theorem 2).
We consider it an interesting open question if there is another structural property (unrelated to the
complexity measures of the hypotheses) which applies to multi-parameter revenue maximization
and, ideally, to a large family of problems, which lead to improved sample complexity bounds.
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A Lower Bound for Finite-domain Problems: Proof of Theorem 2
For notation simplicity, we consider T “ t0,˘1, . . . ,˘ku with support size 2k`1. We first define the
hypothesis class H. Each hypothesis is specified by a binary nk-dimensional vector v P t˘1unˆk.
Specifically, H “ thvu where hv : T n Ñ r0, 1s is defined as
hvptq :“ 1
„
Di P rns, j P rks, t “
ˆ
0, . . . , 0, vi,j ¨ j
i’th
, 0, . . . , 0
˙
.
Next, we consider a family of distributions D “ tDvu that are also indexed by v. For each
dimension i of Dv, the probability density function is defined as the following:
fDv
i
ptiq “
$’&
’%
1´ 1
n
, if ti “ 0
1
2nk
p1´ ǫq, if ti “ ´vi,j ¨ j for some j P rks
1
2nk
p1` ǫq, if ti “ vi,j ¨ j for some j P rks
Our plan is to show that any algorithm that gets a ǫ-approximation on all distributions in D must
take Ωpnk
ǫ2
q number of samples.
When the underlying distribution isDv, the corresponding optimal hypothesis is hv. Intuitively,
in order to achieve a good approximation to hv, an algorithm has to specify a vector v1 close enough
to v based on the samples. We formalize the intuition by calculating the loss of choosing hv
1
.
Lemma 14. For all v,v1, we have
hvpDvq ´ hv1pDvq “ Ωp ǫ
nk
¨ dpv,v1qq,
where dpv,v1q is the hamming distance between v and v1.
24
Proof. For all v,v1, we have that
hvpDv1q “
nÿ
i“1
kÿ
j“1
Prti„Dvi rti “ v1i,j ¨ js ¨
ź
ℓ‰i
Prtℓ„Dvℓ rtℓ “ 0s
“ p1´ 1
n
qn´1
nÿ
i“1
kÿ
j“1
Prti„Dvi rti “ v1i,j ¨ js
“ p1´ 1
n
qn´1
nÿ
i“1
kÿ
j“1
„
1rvi,j “ v1i,js ¨
1` ǫ
2nk
` 1rvi,j ‰ v1i,js ¨
1´ ǫ
2nk

.
Next, we bound the lose of choosing hv
1
by the hamming distance between v and v1.
hvpDvq ´ hv1pDvq “ p1´ 1
n
qn´1
nÿ
i“1
kÿ
j“1
1rvi,j ‰ v1i,js ¨
ǫ
nk
“ Ωp ǫ
nk
¨ dpv,v1qq
Let s be the samples and A be any (randomized) algorithm that takes samples s as inputs and
outputs a vector Apsq P t˘1unˆk. The next lemma states that if two distributions differ in only
one dimension, then the total probability of A guessing wrongly for the two distributions is at least
Ωp1q if the number of samples is Opnk
ǫ2
q.
Lemma 15. For any Dv¯ and Dv where Dv¯ and Dv only differ in one dimension pi, jq, i.e.,
v¯i,j “ 1, vi,j “ ´1, and for any algorithm A, when N “ Opnkǫ2 q,
Prs„pDv¯qN rApsqi,j ‰ v¯i,js `Prs„pDvqN rApsqi,j ‰ vi,js ě Ωp1q.
Proof. Since the n dimensions of the distribution are independent, to guess the pi, jq-th dimension of
the underlying v, the only useful samples are those s with si “ ˘j, which happens with probability
1
nk
. Thus, when the number of samples is Opnk
ǫ2
q, with high probability, we have at most Op 1
ǫ2
q
number of useful samples. Note that these samples are either from
f¯p˘jq “ 1˘ ǫ
2
or fp˘jq “ 1¯ ǫ
2
.
whose total variation distance is Θpǫq, then if we only have Op 1
ǫ2
q samples, with constant probability
we cannot distinguish distinguish whether the samples are from Dv¯ or Dv. In other words, for any
algorithm A, Apsqi,j must be inconsistent with the underlying distribution with constant probability,
which concludes the proof.
To finish the proof, we consider the performance of A on a uniform distribution over all distri-
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θn Ð 0;
OptpDnq “ Etn„Dnrtns;
for i from n´ 1 to 1 do
θi Ð OptpDěi`1q;
OptpDěiq “ Etiěθirtis `Prrti ă θisOptpDěi`1q;
end
// online strategy
iÐ 1;
while i ď n do
if ti ě θi then
Accept ti and stop;
else
iÐ i` 1 // observe the next reward
end
if i=n then
Accept tn and stop // if no item has been accepted, accept the last one
end
end
Algorithm 1: Optimal Strategy for Prophet Inequality in Bounded-support Case
butions in D. Formally, let U be a uniform distribution on t˘1unˆk, we have
Ev„UEs„pDvqN rdpApsq,vqs “
nÿ
i“1
kÿ
j“1
Ev„UEs„pDvqN r1pApsqi,j ‰ vi,jqs
“
nÿ
i“1
kÿ
j“1
Ev„UPrs„pDvqN rApsqi,jq ‰ vi,js
“ 1
2
nÿ
i“1
kÿ
j“1
´
Ev¯„UPrs„pDv¯qN rApsqi,jq ‰ v¯i,js
` Ev„UPrs„pDvqN rApsqi,jq ‰ vi,js
¯
ě Ωpnkq, (by Lemma 15)
where dp¨, ¨q denotes the hamming distance. By Lemma 14, this implies a Ωpǫq error of the output.
Therefore, there exists a distribution Dv that cannot be learned by A with Opǫq additive error.
B Missing Proofs about Prophet Inequality
B.1 Optimal Hypothesis
An optimal strategy of prophet inequality when D has bounded support, denote as SD, is called
backward induction, where we recursively compute the optimal reward for items appear behind i
and set the thresholds θi for item i. The algorithm for setting the strategy is as follows:
One particular note for this strategy is that the thresholds for the last n ´ i ` 1 dimension of
D is independent of the arrivals there are before ti. Therefore, in further discussion we can abuse
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hěipDq to denote the expected reward of running the last n ´ i ` 1 dimension of an backward
induction strategy S on Děi “
śn
j“iDj .
B.2 Discretization and Sample Complexity: Proof of Theorem 6
Let Dǫ{2 be the discretized version of D obtained from rounding the values of each marginal
distribution Di down to the nearest multiples of ǫ. For all type t „ D, define its downward
discretization
tǫ{2 “ t
2t
ǫ
u ¨ ǫ
2
,
also, for the optimal strategy SD define a coupling optimal strategy S
1
D for tǫ{2 „ Dǫ{2: First
re-sample
r „
nź
i“1
Dipt | t P rptiqǫ{2, ptiqǫ{2 `
ǫ
2
qq ,
then perform the original SD on t
1 “ tǫ{2 ` r and return the accepted item. We introduce the
re-sample step because t1 and t „ D have the same distribution. Hence at any step i P rns, the
probability that S1D accepts tǫ{2 „ Dǫ{2 equals to that of SD accepts t „ D. We further show that
the expected reward of the coupling optimal strategy is an ǫ-additive approximation of the original
one:
Lemma 16. Under the above definition, we have
ES1
D
phS1
D
pDǫ{2qq ě hSDpDq ´
ǫ
2
.
Proof.
ES1
D
phS1
D
pDǫ{2qq “
ż
tPr0,1sn
Prpt1 “ tq ¨ hS1
D
ptqdt
ď
ż
tPr0,1sn
fDptq ¨
[
2hS1
D
ptq
ǫ
_
¨ ǫ
2
dt
ď
ż
tPr0,1sn
fDptq ¨ hSDptqdt´
ǫ
2
“ hSDpDq ´
ǫ
2
Now we go to the proof of Theorem 6. Let Eǫ{2 be the distribution obtained from rounding
down the values of each dimension of E to the nearest supports of ǫ
2
. We want to show that, when
N ě C ¨ n
ǫ3
logp n
ǫδ
q, hSEǫ{2 will become the near-optimal hypothesis of D.
Since Eǫ{2 is also the empirical distribution of Dǫ{2, and has finite support with size 1ǫ{2 in each
dimension, a corollary of Theorem 1 shows that when N ě C ¨ n
ǫ3
logp n
ǫδ
q,
hSDǫ{2
pDǫ{2q ´ hSEǫ{2 pDǫ{2q ď
ǫ
2
(12)
Then
hSDpDq ď ES1
D
phS1
D
pDǫ{2qq `
ǫ
2
( Lemma 16)
ď hSDǫ{2 pDǫ{2q `
ǫ
2
(Optimality of SDǫ{2)
ď hSEǫ{2 pDǫ{2q ` ǫ (From (12))
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It remains to show hSEǫ{2 pDǫ{2q approximates hSEǫ{2 pDq, i.e. the actual expected reward from
the learned hypothesis. We elaborate it as follows:
Lemma 17.
hSEǫ{2
pDǫ{2q ď hSEǫ{2 pDq .
Proof. Suppose Eǫ{2 is specified by thresholds θ “ pθ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , θnq. We can assume without loss of
generality that each θi is the multiple of
ǫ
2
, since rounding the thresholds up does not affect the
behavior of the strategy on Eǫ{2.
Therefore, for any type t and its downward discretization tǫ{2, SEǫ{2 accepts t at the i
th step if
and only if SEǫ{2 accepts tǫ{2 at the i
th step. This gives that
hSEǫ{2
pDq “
ż
tPr0,1sn
fDptqhSEǫ{2 ptqdt
ě
ż
tPr0,1sn
fDptqhSEǫ{2 ptǫ{2qdt
“
ż
tPr0,1sn
fDǫ{2ptqhSEǫ{2 ptǫ{2qdt
“ hSEǫ{2 pDǫ{2q .
With this lemma in hand, we can complete the proof of Theorem 6.
B.3 Strong Monotonicity: Proof of Lemma 12
From now on, we abuse hěipDq to denote the expected revenue of running the last n´i`1 dimension
of S
D˜ěi
on Děi. We want to show by backward induction on i that @ product distributions D, D˜
such that D ľ D˜, the expected reward of performing S
D˜
on the last n´ i` 1 dimension of D is at
least that of performing S
D˜
on the last n´ i` 1 dimension of D˜, i.e.
hěipDěiq ě hěipD˜ěiq .
Base case: When i “ n, there is only one item with value tn, and SD˜ěn accepts it with
probability 1 and obtains the reward tn. Therefore, we have
hěnpDq “ EDnrtns “
ż 8
t“0
qDnptqdt
ě
ż 8
t“0
qD˜nptqdt (Dn ľ D˜n)
“ ED˜nrtns “ hěnpD˜q .
Inductive step: Assume the induction hypothesis holds for all j ą i, i.e. @j ą i hějpDq ě
hějpD˜q. Then since hěipDq satisfies the following recursion:
hěipDq “ PrDirti ě θis ¨ EDirti | ti ě θis `PrDirti ă θis ¨ hěi`1pDq
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where the first term on the right-hand-side is the expected reward when the ith item is accepted,
while the second one is the expected reward when the strategy accepts subsequent item. A similar
recursion holds for hěipD˜q:
hěipD˜q “ PrDirti ě θis ¨ EDirti | ti ě θis `PrDirti ă θis ¨ hěi`1pDq
We then compare the first and the second term of hěipDq and hěipD˜q respectively.
hěipDq
“PrDirti ě θis ¨ EDirti | ti ě θis `PrDirti ă θis ¨ hěi`1pDq
ěPrDirti ě θis ¨ ED˜irti | ti ě θis ` p1´PrDirti ě θisq ¨ hěi`1pD˜q
“PrD˜irti ě θis ¨ ED˜irti | ti ě θis ` pPrDirti ě θis ´PrD˜irti ě θisq ¨ ED˜irti | ti ě θis
` p1´PrDirti ě θisq ¨ hěi`1pD˜q (13)
where the first inequality comes from Di ľ D˜i and the induction hypothesis. Furthermore, from
the optimality of S
D˜
on D˜,we must have
ED˜i
rti | ti ě θis ě hěi`1pD˜q ,
Otherwise S
D˜
could discard ti unconditionally and achieve higher expected revenue. Therefore,
p13q ě PrD˜irti ě θis ¨ ED˜irti | ti ě θis ` pPrDirti ě θis ´PrD˜irti ě θisq ¨ hěi`1pD˜q
` p1´PrDirti ě θisq ¨ hěi`1pD˜q
“ PrD˜irti ě θis ¨ ED˜irti | ti ě θis `PrD˜irti ă θis ¨ hěi`1pD˜q
“ hěipD˜q .
B.4 Prophet Inequality with i.i.d. Unbounded Rewards
In [12], an ǫ-approximately optimal strategy for known distribution in the unbounded support and
i.i.d. case has been introduced. Denote the strategy for distribution D as RD. We restate the
algorithm to generate RD is as follows:
In the following discussion, we will show a new sample complexity bound of achieving ǫ-
multiplicative approximation in the unbounded optimal stopping game.
Lemma 18. For arbitrary distribution D, the sample complexity required for Algorithm 2 is at
most O˜p n
ǫ2
q.
The algorithm is to run the strategy R on a dominated empirical distribution E˜, which is defined
below:
FE˜pxq “ mint1, FEpxq ´
c
2FEpxqp1´ FEpxqq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
´ 4 lnp2Nnδ
´1q
N
u .
In Lemma 5 of Guo et al. [19], it is shown that with high probability D ľ E˜ via a standard
concentration bound.
In the following discussion, denote the stopping time of running strategy R on input t as τpR, tq
Lemma 19. With high probability over samples for the algorithm,
hRDpDq ´ hRE˜pDq ă Prt„DnrτpRE˜, tq ă τpRD, tqs ¨OptpDq .
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Solve differential equation y1 “ yplogpyq ´ 1q ´ pβ ´ 1q and yp0q “ 1
where β « 1{0.745 ;
for i from 1 to n do
ǫi Ð 1´ ypi{nq1{pn´1q;
end
// online strategy ;
iÐ 1;
while i ď n do
if ǫi ă ǫn then
ǫi Ð 0 // Skip when acceptance probability ă ǫn ;
end
if qDiptiq ď ǫi then
Accept ti and stop;
else
iÐ i` 1;
end
end
Algorithm 2: Approximately Optimal Strategy for Unbounded Support Case
Proof. Since D ľ E˜ with high probability, @t P rns the value threshold in R
E˜
is lower than that of
RD, i.e.
FE˜ppFDq´1p1´ ǫtqq ą FDppFDq´1p1´ ǫtqq ,
Therefore, fix an input value configuration t, τpR
E˜
, tq ď τpRD, tq, and the only case where the
revenue obtained from R
E˜
is smaller than that from RD should be τpRE˜, tq ă τpRD, tq.
Now it suffices to show that
ErhRDpDq ´ hRE˜pDq | τpRE˜, tq ă τpRD, tqs “ OpOptpDqq .
For all t P rns, define At as the set of input such that RE˜ accepts at time t but RD does not accept:
Then we can rewrite the above conditioned expected difference of revenue as follows:
ErhRDpDq ´ hRE˜pDq | τpRE˜, tq ă τpRD, tqs
“ ErhRDpDq ´ hRE˜pDq | t P Yn´1t“1 Ats
ď ErhRDpDq | t P Yn´1t“1 Ats phRE˜pDq ą 0q
“ max
tPrn´1s
ErhRDpDq | t P Ats
“ max
tPrn´1s
ErhRDpDq | RD does not accept before ts
ď OptpDq
Lemma 20. When m ě O˜pnǫ´2q, with high probability over samples for the algorithm,
Prt„DnrτpRE˜, tq ă τpRD, tqs ă Opǫq .
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Proof.
Prt„DnrτpRE˜, tq ă τpRD, tqs (14)
ďPrt„Dnrt P
n´1ÿ
t“1
Ats
ď
n´1ÿ
t“1
Prt„Dnrǫt ď qE˜pXiq ď ǫt `
c
8ǫtp1´ ǫtq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
` 7 lnp2Nnδ
´1q
N
s
ď
n´1ÿ
t“1
p
c
8ǫtp1´ ǫtq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
` 7 lnp2Nnδ
´1q
N
q (15)
“
n´1ÿ
t“1
c
8ǫtp1´ ǫtq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
`Opǫ2q , (16)
the second inequality is also shown in Lemma 7 of Guo et al. [19] to be hold with high probability.
Recall from Algorithm 2 that ǫt “ 1´ yp tnq1{pn´1q. Now we bound (16) for yp tnq ă 1n or yp tnq ą 1n :
Case 1: yp t
n
q ě 1
n
. In this case,
ǫt “ 1´ y
1
n´1 ď 1´ e log yn´1 ď 1´ e´ log nn´1 ď log n
n
,
Therefore when m ě nǫ´2 log n
ÿ
yp t
n
qě 1
n
c
ǫtp1´ ǫtq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
ď n ¨
c
log n{n ¨ 1 ¨ lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
“ Opǫq .
Case 2: yp t
n
q ă 1
n
. Since ypxq P r0, 1s when x P r0, 1s, we have @x P r0, 1s,
y1pxq “ yplog y ´ 1q ´ pβ ´ 1q ď ´pβ ´ 1q ď ´0.3414
Therefore
|tt P rn ´ 1s, s.t. yp t
n
q ă 1
n
u| ď 1
n
¨ 1
0.3414
¨ n ď 3 ,
and when N ě nǫ´2 log n,
ÿ
yp t
n
qă 1
n
c
ǫtp1´ ǫtq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
ď 3 ¨
c
ǫtp1´ ǫtq
N
lnp2Nnδ´1q “ Op ǫ?
n
q .
Combining the two cases, we have
Prt„DnrτpRE˜, tq ă τpRD, tqs
ď 4
ÿ
yp t
n
qă 1
n
c
ǫtp1´ ǫtq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
` 4
ÿ
yp t
n
qě 1
n
c
ǫtp1´ ǫtq lnp2Nnδ´1q
N
`Opǫ2q
“ Opǫq .
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iÐ 1;
while i ď n do
Open the ith box and set Ui Ð maxjďi tj ;
if Ui ě σi then
Accept Ui and stop // accept the highest opened box so far ;
else
iÐ i` 1;
end
end
if i=n then
Accept Un and stop // if no item has been accepted, accept the box with highest reward ;
end
Algorithm 3: Frequency Number Computation
C Missing Proofs about Pandora’s Problem
C.1 Optimal Hypothesis
Optimal strategy of Pandora’s problem An optimal strategy SD for D, introduced by [38],
opens the boxes sequentially according to its reservation value σi, the threshold of the maximum
realized values below which opening the i ` 1th box will give rise to a higher expected reward. A
formal definition of σi is as follows:
σi
def“ inf
σ
pEti„Dirpti ´ σq`s “ ciq .
we assume without loss of generality that the reserve value is non-increasing with the index of each
box, i.e. σ1 ě σ2 ě σn.
Also, for convenience we use Ui to denote the maximum value among the first i boxes:
Ui
def“ max
jďi
tj ,
and let U0
def“ 0.
We restate the optimal strategy SD in [38] as Algorithm 3:
C.2 Discretization and Sample Complexity: Proof of Theorem 7
The proof of Theorem 7 is almost the same as that of Theorem 6. We include it here only for
completeness.
Let Dǫ{2 be the discretized version of D obtained from rounding the values of each marginal
distribution Di down to the nearest multiples of ǫ. Also, for all type t „ D, let tǫ{2 be its downward
discretization to the multiples of ǫ
2
. For the optimal strategy SD define a coupling optimal strategy
S1D for discretized type tǫ{2: First re-sample
r „
nź
i“1
Dipt | t P rptiqǫ{2, ptiqǫ{2 `
ǫ
2
qq ,
then perform the original SD on t
1 “ tǫ{2 ` r and return the accepted item. It is easy to see that
after the re-sample step t1 has the same distribution as t „ D. Hence at any step i P rns and for
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any j P ris, the probability that S1D accepts the jth box of tǫ{2 „ Dǫ{2 equals to that of SD accepts
the jth box of t „ D. We further show that the expected reward of the coupling optimal strategy
is an ǫ-additive approximation of the original one:
Lemma 21. Under the above definition, we have
ES1
D
phS1
D
pDǫ{2qq ě hSDpDq ´
ǫ
2
.
Proof. Same as the proof of Lemma 16.
Now we go to the proof of Theorem 7. Let Eǫ{2 be the distribution obtained from rounding
down the values of each dimension of E to the nearest supports of ǫ
2
. We want to show that, when
N ě C ¨ n3
ǫ3
logp n
ǫδ
q, hSEǫ{2 will become the near-optimal hypothesis of D.
Since Eǫ{2 is also the empirical distribution of Dǫ{2, and has finite support with size 1ǫ{2 in each
dimension. Because the value value is bounded in r´n, 1s, a corollary of Theorem 1 shows that
when N ě C ¨ n3
ǫ3
logp n
ǫδ
q for a large enough constant C,
hSDǫ{2
pDǫ{2q ` n
n` 1 ´
hSEǫ{2
pDǫ{2q ` n
n` 1 ď
ǫ
2pn` 1q (17)
Then
hSDpDq ď ES1
D
phS1
D
pDǫ{2qq `
ǫ
2
( Lemma 21)
ď hSDǫ{2 pDǫ{2q `
ǫ
2
(Optimality of SDǫ{2)
ď hSEǫ{2 pDǫ{2q ` ǫ ( (17))
It remains to show hSEǫ{2 pDǫ{2q approximates hSEǫ{2 pDq, i.e. the actual expected reward from
the learned hypothesis. We elaborate it as follows:
Lemma 22.
hSEǫ{2
pDǫ{2q ď hSEǫ{2 pDq .
Proof. Same as the proof of Lemma 17.
With this lemma in hand, we can complete the proof of Theorem 7.
C.3 Strong Monotonicity: Proof of Lemma 13
It suffices to show that for any D ľ D˜,
hS
D˜
pDq ě hS
D˜
pD˜q .
Lemma 23. For any H ď σi`1,
hS
D˜
pD˜|Ui “ Hq ď σi`1 ´
iÿ
j“1
cj
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Proof. Since S
D˜
is the optimal strategy, hS
D˜
pD˜|Ui “ Hq is monotone in H, so it is only necessary
to show the case when Ui “ H “ σi`1. But in this case, simply choosing the largest among first i
boxes would give a revenue of σi`1 ´
ři
j“1 cj , so
hS
D˜
pD˜|Ui “ σi`1q ď σi`1 ´
iÿ
j“1
cj
is true due to the optimality of the mechanism.
We will use backward induction from n to 0 to prove the following statement.
Lemma 24. For any 0 ď i ď n and any u1i ď ui ď σi`1,
hS
D˜
pD˜|Ui “ uiq ą hS
D˜
pD˜|Ui “ u1iq .
Proof. This holds trivially when i “ n. In the following discussion, assume i ă n and the lemma
holds for i` 1.
If Ui ď σi`1, the mechanism will choose to open the next box. In this case, becauseDi`1 ľ ˜Di`1,
it suffices to show that for any ti`1 ě t1i`1,
hS
D˜
pD|Ui “ ui,Xi`1 “ ti`1q ě hS
D˜
pD˜|Ui “ u1i,Xi`1 “ t1i`1q .
So it is enough to show that for any ui`1 ě u1i`1,
hS
D˜
pD|Ui`1 “ ui`1q ě hS
D˜
pD˜|Ui`1 “ u1i`1q .
We will consider three cases. In the first case, ui`1 ě u1i`1 ą σi`2. Then
hS
D˜
pDq “ ui`1 ´
iÿ
j“1
ci ě u1i`1 ´
iÿ
j“1
cj “ hS
D˜
pD˜q .
In the second case, ui`1 ą σi`2 ě u1i`1, then we can apply Lemma 23 and have
hS
D˜
pD˜q ď σi`2 ´
i`1ÿ
j“1
ci ă ui`1 ´
i`1ÿ
j“1
ck “ hS
D˜
pDq
In third case, σi`2 ě ui`1 ě u1i`1, the inequality follows directly from induction assumption.
C.4 Tight Bounds: Proof of Theorem 13
C.4.1 Upper Bound
We start by recalling the main obstacle for getting an O˜
`
n
ǫ2
˘
sample complexity upper bound as a
direct corollary of Theorem 8. In Pandora’s problem, an algorithm may pay a cost up to 1 to open
each box and thus, the range of the realized objective is r´n, 1s instead of r0, 1s. In the main text,
we use a simple hypothesis class H, which has a hypothesis hA for each algorithm A, normalizing its
value to be in r0, 1s by letting it be the realized objective of A plus n and scaled by 1
n`1 . Therefore,
to get an ǫ-additive approximation in Pandora’s problem, we need a ǫ
n`1 -additive approximation
w.r.t. the general learning problem H. Therefore, applying Theorem 8 to this hypothesis class H
gives only an O˜
`
n3
ǫ2
˘
sample complexity bound.
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Although the objective could be as small as ´n in the worst cases, intuitively the chance of
getting such a bad objective shall be negligible if the algorithm is reasonable w.r.t. the underlying
distribution. Indeed, we will reason that it is without loss of generality to consider algorithms that
stop whenever the cost exceeds log 1
ǫ
. As a result, we avoid scaling the value of the hypotheses by
a n` 1 factor.
In particular, we consider the following notion of rational algorithms w.r.t. a given distribution.
Definition 4 (Rational Algorithms). For any distribution D and any cost vector c, an algorithm
A for the Pandora’s problem is rational w.r.t. D and c if whenever A opens a box i, the expected
increase in the best observed reward is greater than or equal to the cost ci.
The next lemma follows by the definition of the optimal algorithm.
Lemma 25. Suppose A is the optimal algorithm w.r.t. a distribution D˜ and a cost vector c. Then,
A is rational w.r.t. any distribution D that stochastically dominates (including D˜ itself), and c.
We will need a standard Bernstein type concentration bound for submartingales.
Lemma 26. Let S0, S1 ¨ ¨ ¨ , Sn be a submartingale with respect to filtration F0,F1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Fk. Suppose
S0 “ 0, |Si ´ Si´1| ďM ,
řn
i“1 ErpSi ´ Si´1q2|Fi´1s ď L, then for any positive ∆,
PrrSn ă ´∆s ď exp
ˆ
∆2
2L` p2{3qM∆
˙
.
Lemma 27. Suppose an algorithm A is rational w.r.t. a distribution D and a cost vector c. Then,
the probability that A pays a cost more than Ω
`
log 1
ǫ
˘
is at most ǫ.
Proof. For 1 ď i ď n, let Xi be objective after round i; if the algorithm stops before round i, let
Xi “ Xi´1. Let X0 “ 0. Then, by that A is rational, we have:
E
“
Xi|X1,X2, . . . ,Xi´1
‰ ě Xi´1 .
That is, Xi’s form a discrete-time submartingale.
We have ´1 ď Xi´Xi´1 ď 1 by definition. Further, for any round 1 ď i ď n, Xi´Xi´1 is upper
bounded by the increment in the best observed reward in the round. Therefore,
ř
i:XiěXi´1pXi ´
Xi´1q is at most the best observed reward at the end, which is upper bounded by 1. Hence, we
have:
nÿ
i“1
E
“pXi ´Xi´1q2‰ ď nÿ
i“1
E
“ˇˇ
Xi ´Xi´1
ˇˇ‰
(´1 ď Xi ´Xi´1 ď 1)
“ E
„ nÿ
i“1
pXi´1 ´Xiq ` 2
ÿ
i:XiěXi´1
pXi ´Xi´1q

“ ´E“Xn‰` 2 ¨ E
„ ÿ
i:XiěXi´1
pXi ´Xi´1q

ď 2 . (ři:XiěXi´1pXi ´Xi´1q ď 1)
Since the cost is at most ´Xn by definition, it suffices to upper bound the probability that
Xn ď ´Ω
`
log 1
ǫ
˘
. Then, the lemma follows by Bernstein’s inequality for submartingales.
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In the following arguments, consider a hypothesis class H, which has a hypothesis for any
algorithm A such that its value equals the objective of A, without scaling. Further, fixed the cost
vector c, let hD be the hypothesis that corresponds to the optimal algorithm for D and c. Finally,
let h¯D be the hypothesis that corresponds to a truncated version of the optimal algorithm for D,
which stops whenever the cost exceeds Ω
`
log 1
ǫ
˘
.
Lemma 28. Fixed any cost vector c. For any D ľ D˜, the truncated version of optimal algorithm
w.r.t. D˜ gets an expected value greater than or equal to that of the untruncated version minus ǫ:
h¯
D˜
`
D
˘ ě h
D˜
`
D
˘´ ǫ .
Proof. By Lemma 25, h
D˜
is rational w.r.t. D and c. Hence, by Lemma 27, the probability that
the truncated version h¯
D˜
and the original version h
D˜
give different outcomes is at most ǫ. Finally,
whenever they are different, h
D˜
gets at most 1 extra reward in subsequent rounds. Putting together
proves the lemma.
We now prove the stated sample complexity upper bound.
Proof of Theorem 13 (Upper Bound). We show that the truncated version of PERM gets the stated
sample complexity bound. We prove an Opǫq-additive approximation with the understanding that
changing ǫ by a constant factor does not affect the stated sample complexity bound asymptotically.
It follows from a sequence of inequalities below, similar to those in Section 4:
h¯E
`
D
˘ ě h¯E`Dˆ˘´O` log 1ǫ ˘ ¨ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (h¯E bounded in r´O` log 1ǫ ˘, 1s)
ě hE
`
Dˆ
˘´ ǫ´O` log 1
ǫ
˘ ¨ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (Lemma 28)
ě hE
`
E
˘´ ǫ´O` log 1
ǫ
˘ ¨ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (strong monotonicity, Dˆ ľ E)
“ Opt`E˘´ ǫ´O` log 1
ǫ
˘ ¨ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (definition of Opt`E˘)
ě Opt`Dˇ˘´ ǫ´O` log 1
ǫ
˘ ¨ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (weak monotonicity, E ľ Dˇ)
ě h¯D
`
Dˇ
˘´ ǫ´O` log 1
ǫ
˘ ¨ δ`Dˆ,D˘ (definition of Opt`Dˇ˘)
ě h¯D
`
D
˘´ ǫ´O` log 1
ǫ
˘ ¨ `δ`Dˆ,D˘ ` δ`Dˇ,D˘˘ (h¯D bounded in r´O` log 1ǫ ˘, 1s)
ě hD
`
D
˘´ 2ǫ´O` log 1
ǫ
˘ ¨ `δ`Dˆ,D˘` δ`Dˇ,D˘˘ (Lemma 28)
“ Opt`D˘´ 2ǫ´O` log 1
ǫ
˘ ¨ `δ`Dˆ,D˘` δ`Dˇ,D˘˘ . (definition of Opt`D˘)
By Lemma 2, Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, we get an Opǫq-additive approximation.
C.4.2 Lower Bound
Consider n boxes with cost 1
n
each. Consider 2n potential instances, in which the reward distribution
of each box is either D` or D´, defined by the following probability mass functions respectively:
fD`pxq “
#
1`ǫ
n
x “ 1 ;
1´ 1`ǫ
n
x “ 0 . fD´pxq “
#
1´ǫ
n
x “ 1 ;
1´ 1´ǫ
n
x “ 0 .
We will refer to each of these 2n instances by the distribution D, since the cost vector c is fixed.
The next lemma follows by the above definition and and simple calculations which we omit.
Lemma 29. The squared Hellinger distance between D` and D´ is bounded by:
H2
`
D`,D´
˘ “ Oˆ n
ǫ2
˙
.
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To distinguish the algorithm for Pandora’s problem and the learning algorithm, we will refer to
the former as a hypothesis.
Since the rewards are either 0 or 1, any hypothesis is characterized by an ordered subsequence
i1, i2, . . . , ik of the boxes such that it opens the boxes one by one until it gets a reward 1; if all k
rewards are 0, it stops and leaves the remaining n ´ k boxes unopened. The optimal hypothesis
chooses a box into the subsequence if and only if its distribution equals D` (order is irrelevant
since they are identical). Therefore, for any instance D defined above, any hypothesis h, and any
box 1 ď i ď n, we say that h makes a mistake on box i w.r.t. D if either Di “ D` but i isn’t in
the subsequence chosen by h, or Di “ D´ but i is in the subsequence. We simply say that the
algorithm makes a mistake on box i w.r.t D if it selects a hypothesis that makes such a mistake.
Whether a given learning algorithm makes a mistake might be a random event if it is randomized.
In the rest of the argument, we first argue that the additive approximation error scales linearly
with number of mistakes made by the chosen hypothesis. Then, we argue through a sequence of
lemmas that for any algorithm that takes less than c ¨ n
ǫ2
samples for some sufficiently small constant
c ą 0, there is an instance D for which it picks a hypothesis that makes Ω`n˘ mistakes with at
least constant probability.
Lemma 30. For any instance D, if a hypothesis h makes k mistakes, then we have:
h
`
D
˘ ď Opt`D˘´ Ωˆkǫ
n
˙
.
Proof. Suppose the instance have n` and n´ boxes with reward distributions equal to D` and D´
respectively. Further suppose h makes k` and k´ mistakes on the two types of boxes. Hence, h
includes n` ´ k` boxes with distributions equal to D` and k´ boxes with distributions equal to
D´ in its subsequence.
The expected reward minus cost for opening a box with distribution D` is ǫ
n
; opening a box
with distribution D´ gives ´ ǫ
n
. Further, the probability of opening the i-th box in the sequence is
equal to the probability that the first i´ 1 rewards are all 0.
Hence, the optimal is:
Opt
`
D
˘ “ ǫ
n
ˆ
1`
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙
` ¨ ¨ ¨ `
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙n`´1˙
.
The expected value of the hypothesis is at most (when it opens the n`´ k` boxes with reward
distributions equal to D` first):
h
`
D
˘ ď ǫ
n
ˆ n`´k`ÿ
i“1
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙i´1
´
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙n`´k` k´ÿ
i“1
ˆ
1´ 1´ ǫ
n
˙i´1˙
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Therefore, we have:
Opt
`
D
˘´ h`D˘ ě ǫ
n
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙n`´k`ˆ k`ÿ
i“1
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙i´1
`
k´ÿ
i“1
ˆ
1´ 1´ ǫ
n
˙i´1˙
ě ǫ
n
ˆ k`ÿ
i“1
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙n
`
k´ÿ
i“1
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙n˙
“ ǫk
n
ˆ
1´ 1` ǫ
n
˙n
ě ǫk
n
exp
`´ 2´ 2ǫ˘ .
The last inequality is due to 1´ x ą e´2x for 0 ă x ă 1
2
.
Lemma 31. For any algorithm A, any box 1 ď i ď n, and any two neighboring instances D` and
D´ that differ only in the i-th coordinate, we have:
Pr
“
A makes a mistake on box i w.r.t. D`
‰`Pr“A makes a mistake on box i w.r.t. D´‰ ě Ωp1q .
Proof. By definition, any hypothesis h makes a mistake on box i w.r.t. either D` or D´. Let H`
and H´ denote the two subsets of hypotheses respectively. On the one hand, we have:
Pr
“
A picks h P H` given samples from D`‰`Pr“A picks h P H´ given samples from D`‰ “ 1 .
On the other hand, with less than c ¨ n
ǫ2
samples for some sufficiently constant c ą 0, and by
Lemma 29, we have:
Pr
“
A picks h P H´ given samples from D`‰
ěPr“A picks h P H´ given samples from D´‰´Op1q ,
for a sufficiently small constant inside the big-O notation. Putting together proves the lemma.
As a direct corollary, we have the following via a simple counting argument.
Lemma 32. There is an instance D for which the algorithm makes Ωpnq mistakes in expectation.
Proof. By Lemma 31, if D is chosen from the 2n possible instances uniformly at random, the
algorithm makes a mistake on each box i with constant probability. So the lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 13 (Lower Bound). Consider the instance in Lemma 32. Suppose the algorithm
makes αn mistakes in expectation where α ą 0 is a constant. Then, by a standard probability
argument, the probability that it makes at least αn
2
mistakes is at least 1
2
. Hence, by Lemma 30,
the expected additive error is at least Ωpǫq.
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